Different Kinds of Naturalistic Explanations of Linguistic Behaviour by Bremer, Manuel
  35
Different Kinds of Naturalistic Explanations of Linguistic Behaviour 
 
Manuel Bremer, Köln 
 
 
1. Can there be naturalistic explanations of 
linguistic behaviour? 
“Naturalization” nowadays is often recommended 
to cure all kinds of philosophical worries and solve old 
problems. There might be an “epistemology naturalized” 
and a naturalized philosophy of language. But “naturalism” 
is understood in quite different fashions. It might be meant 
as a metaphysical thesis more or the less equivalent to 
materialism, or it concerns the way of doing things 
philosophically.  
I will be concerned with partially explicating 
methodological naturalism in the philosophy of language. 
The essential question is 
(Q1) What is meant by giving a naturalistic 
explanation of some kind of linguistic behaviour? 
And assuming some answer to this question, the 
essential problem is 
(Q2) Do these naturalistic explanations explain 
anything at all? 
One could think naturalism is more about 
describing events than explaining them. Descriptions seem 
to be just the opposite of explanations. One could think, on 
the other hand, that naturalism in the philosophy of 
language employs some kind of reductionist explanations 
of linguistic behaviour (in terms of neurophysiology or 
whatever is considered as the basic science). But given 
the anti-reductionist arguments concerning the rule 
governed nature of using language (especially the socially 
mastered rules of using words to refer to something), one 
might suspect that these reductionist explanations are at 
the wrong level of theory building to explain overt linguistic 
behaviour (e.g., being criticized for using expression α on 
occasion s) at all. If we ask why we speak the way we 
speak, an account in terms of neurophysiology, so the 
argument runs, gives us no reason to understand the 
patterns of overt linguistic behaviour. 
Naturalism is often traced back to the work of (the 
late) Wittgenstein. I will start with some remarks about 
Wittgenstein as well. With respect to his analysis in the 
Philosophical Investigations (PI) I introduce a distinction 
between “strong” and “weak” descriptivism (2.). Both forms 
of descriptivism might be seen as answering (Q1). Weak 
Descriptivism can accept the anti-reductionist arguments. 
To see whether it really explains linguistic behaviour  the 
“division problem”, originally introduced by Eli Hirsch 
(Hirsch 1993) in metaphysics, is given a naturalistic 
solution. (Q2) is considered in face of the strategical 
question why “to go naturalistic” in the first place (3.). 
 
2. Strong Descriptivism and Weak 
Descriptivism 
According to Wittgenstein philosophy is merely 
descriptive. There a lots of passage in the Investigations 
stressing this point, e.g.: 
“It leaves everything as it is.” (PI §124)1  
“All explanation has to go, and description has to 
take its place.” (PI §109) 
“Philosophy just states things and does neither 
explain them nor deduce anything from them. – Since 
everything is laid open, there is nothing to explain.” (PI 
§126) 
Now, this claim of “descriptivism”, as I call it, can 
be understood in two ways:2 
(a)  Strong Descriptivism 
Strong Descriptivism claims that philosophy 
describes mere regularities. In its field of investigation (i.e. 
linguistic communities and their behaviour) there are 
regularities. Saying that there are rules amounts to, 
according to (PI §54), watching the events and extracting a 
law, like a law of nature is extracted from regular behaviour 
in other fields of scientific investigation. The very term “law 
of nature” is used here by Wittgenstein. Natural laws are, 
of course, regularities. The objects for which the law of 
nature holds behave as the law tells us, but these objects 
do not orient their behaviour on the law. They do not 
consult the law to confirm to it. Natural laws are not rules 
for the objects under these laws. They do not have to be 
consulted to keep in force. And the observer of such laws 
need not himself understand the laws or make them the 
laws of his behaviour. So philosophy lays open the facts 
that speakers naturally behave in this or that fashion. The 
opinion that language is a rule governed normative 
behaviour overlooks, according to Strong Descriptivism, 
that meaning and reference are fixed by our natural traits. 
The normative idiom (of rule following) is therefore 
dispensable. Philosophy cannot do more than clearly 
describe regularities of linguistic behaviour. Who does not 
recognise this is caught in mistaken pictures and needs 
therapy. (The business of reduction or giving a systematic 
theory of the laws involved need not be part of philosophy.) 
(b)  Weak Descriptivism 
Weak Descriptivism originates as a restriction of 
the claims of Strong Descriptivism. The main weakness of 
Strong Descriptivism is the impossibility, which is not 
argued for here, but which is widely recognised, to forsake  
all rules of argument and speaking. The attempt to forsake 
all rules and normative claims (in using the intentional 
idiom) seems to be both  selfrefutating and against some 
of our most embedded intuitions. Weak Descriptivism tries 
to combine the strength of the naturalistic, descriptivistic 
approach with the thesis that linguistic behaviour is rule 
following behaviour (i.e. that speakers orient themselves 
on rules or conduct their linguistic acts in a way to comply 
to these rules). The strong point of  descriptivism is that 
philosophy leaves everything as it is. Nothing has to be 
constructed to justify some philosophical claim. The basic 
                                                     
1  Translated from the German original by the author. 
2  I am not going to discuss which of the two variants is closer to 
Wittgenstein´s “real” opinion. There are a lot remarks congenial to Strong 
Descriptivism. On the other hand Wittgenstein´s insistence on reasons and the 
more general problems of an eliminativist view on rule following normativity in 
linguistic behaviour, which are also not discusses here, favour, on the 
Principle of Charity, that Wittgenstein himself is closer to Weak Descriptivism. 
See also his remarks on frameworks in On Certainty which point towards 
Weak Descriptivism. 
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structures of our intelligent behaviour are just read off from 
an exact description of our linguistic behaviour. And these 
structures are justified by the fact that the practise which 
exhibits them is successful. Alternatives (including 
alternative philosophical claims on intellectual standards) 
stand on a far less firm ground by not being entrenched in 
our successful way of life (“life form” as Wittgenstein might 
say). 
And at the same time these descriptions can 
speak of normativity – for the simple reasons that 
normativity is present in the observed behaviour: If 
someone is to describe the linguistic behaviour of a 
community, she has to describe the rules/norms which 
govern and constitute this very behaviour. By being 
described norms do not cease to be norms! A statement 
referring to a norm (a statement about a norm) is true only 
if the norm is in force in just that way the statement is 
saying it is.3 
Wittgenstein, for example, once and again 
stresses the fact that a linguistic community evaluates 
some behaviours as “correct” and others as “wrong”. 
These evaluations would make no sense if the person 
whose behaviour was evaluated as “wrong” could not 
reorient her behaviour on the communal standard. For the 
observer of this community this means, as Peter Winch 
has elaborated (cf. Winch 1958), that she understands why 
somebody is criticising somebody else. The observer at 
last can participate in the observed behaviour. All this 
means that speakers orient themselves on linguistic rules 
which are more than mere regularities. A cat might develop 
a regularity responding to similar circumstances (e.g. the 
alarm clock went off) with similar behaviour (e.g. mowing 
for breakfast), but there is no intersubjective standard to 
which the cat´s behaviour confirms. Each new twist 
modifies the regularity. The description just records this 
factual regularity and its development over time. An 
intersubjective rule, in contrast, can be observed to be 
keep in force by evaluations of correct and incorrect 
behaviours. 
So descriptivism in the form of Weak Descriptivism 
does not exclude viewing linguistic behaviour as 
normative. The criticism one might level against naturalism 
on this point does not apply here.  
So how does Weak Descriptivism answer (Q1)? 
If linguistic behaviour is rule governed, a 
systematic description of it is adequate only if the observer 
has understood (and included in her description) what the 
standards are and how the standards are enforced. And 
having understood the rules governing the linguistic 
behaviour the individual behaviour is straight forwardly 
explained using these rules as (part of the) premises. 
The behaviour is explained on the level of linguistic 
“laws”. An anti-reductionist should have nothing to 
complain here. Only a reductionist might complain that this 
is not enough explanation. Seen this way, Weak 
Descriptivism, although being a form of naturalism, is anti-
reductionist! 
 
3. A case study in Weak Descriptivism 
Why should we take the attitude of Weak 
Descriptivism? I will consider one example: the “division 
problem” as thought of by Eli Hirsch. Hirsch is concerned 
with the idea of (natural) kinds. He introduces the thought 
experiment of different kinds of “strange languages”. 
                                                     
3  Much fuss about naturalistic fallacies seems to overlook this simple point. 
Strange languages divide reality in kinds and individuals in 
ways completely different from our normal languages. 
Strange languages seem to be bizarre, seen from the point 
of view of our language. They might introduce kinds 
disjunctively (i.e. “introduce” from the point of view of our 
language, in the strange language these kinds are, of 
course, not disjunctive, but just given). So a strange 
language might contain the kinds cathouse and housecar. 
Seen from our language they can be defined: 
 Cathouse(x) := x is a cat or x is a house 
 Housecar(x) := x is a house or x is a car 
This language has the same expressive power as 
our own, since our ordinary kinds can be defined within 
this language: 
 Cat(x) := Cathouse(x) ∧ ¬ Housecar(x) 
 House(x) := Cathouse(x) ∧ Housecar(x) 
 Car(x) :=  Housecar(x) ∧ ¬ Cathouse(x) 
Now, this strange language has less kinds or kind 
terms than our language. So this language seems to be 
simpler than our language. It carries less ontological 
commitment! For the sake of ontological simplicity we 
should speak this language, but this sounds absurd.  
This is (part of) the division problem. How can it be 
explained that we do not speak a strange language?  A 
non-naturalistic solution could be a (metaphysical) theory 
of natural kinds which could disqualify cathouse and 
housecar. This requires an ontological account of 
naturalness which might be no easy exercise (cf. Hirsch 
1993, 53-78)!  And with respect to this ontological theory 
there still needs to be explained why our language 
structure would follow naturalness, if there is such a thing 
in reality. 
A solution could be found turning to naturalism (in 
the form of Weak Descriptivism): 
The strange language is to be rejected since we 
are built as we are built (i.e., our language faculty is 
structured in some definite way). And the structures of our 
language faculty (especially our habits of categorizing) do 
not allow strange languages. We have to consider them 
strange. So Weak Descriptivism would describe the 
standards of our categorization behaviour: evaluations 
what speakers consider strange explain why there are cat, 
house etc. around, and not cathouse, housecar.  
Weak Descriptivism can explain what we do 
according to the standards it described. It leaves the 
rationality of our behaviour intact. Explanation occurs 
within the framework taken for granted. The rationality of it 
is there – in Wittgenstein´s words in On Certainty – “It is 
there – like our life”. 
But is this really an explanation? Hirsch complains 
that the naturalist would just give us the vacant thesis that 
we were just that way and would give no further argument 
for this to be the case (cf. Hirsch 1993, 116). One might 
ask “Okay, but why are we built this way?”  
This sounds a bit like (Q2).  
Nevertheless, this accusation of naturalism misses 
the whole point of “going naturalistic”. Naturalism is 
pursued since a priori arguments to solve some problem 
have failed. Their failure is the basic reason that only a 
naturalistic account – instead of a sceptic agnosticism – 
can answer to the problem. To go naturalistic means that 
one is referring to facts or describing facts which cannot be 
questioned further. Further inquiries stemming from the 
Different Kinds of Naturalistic Explanations of Linguistic Behaviour - Manuel Bremer 
 
 
 37
philosophical easy chair have to be rejected in favour of 
systematic descriptions or empirical investigations of our 
linguistic faculties (e.g., in cognitive science). Strong 
Descriptivism might try to give an explanation of our 
behaviour by referring to facts outside of the way of life 
described. But these explanations no longer answer to the 
questions put within this way of speaking and acting. Seen 
from this perspective of participants in this way of speaking 
we might leave behind this kind of naturalistic investigation 
altogether. 
A systematic description in the sense of Weak 
Descriptivism can amount to a “rational reconstruction” of 
our intuitions in the field in question. Question (Q2) itself is 
not as obviously relevant to the case in point (e.g., 
Hirsch´s devision problem) as it seems. It could rest on 
seeing the fact that we can ask for explanations of the 
framework itself from without as an insufficiency of giving 
reasons from within: the “why” in question (Q2) really is no 
further “why” of the sort answered by Weak Descriptivism, 
but a different “why” altogether. Knowing why we are 
biologically or neuro-physiologically build the way that we 
are build might be of no great relevance to the questions 
raised.  
This might be the idea of PI §655:  
“It isn`t a question of explaining a language-game 
by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-
game.” 
A reductionist naturalism might be more successful 
with respect to this further investigation in the natural 
history or the causal antecedents of our (linguistic) 
behaviour than a mere description. In a wider scientific 
perspective on linguistic behaviour we probably might be 
interested in reductionist explanations.  
Nevertheless Weak Descriptivism seems to be a 
first option. 
 
4. What´s the distinction between kinds of 
descriptivism worth? 
That there might be different attitudes and aims in 
naturalism has been noted before. The distinction made 
here between Strong and Weak Descriptivism is related, 
for example, to Strawson´s distinction between “strong 
naturalism” and “liberal or catholic naturalism” (cf. 
Strawson 1985). Nevertheless many arguments – 
especially those against naturalism (e.g., in the philosophy 
of mind) – don´t seem to see the distinction.  
This is unfortunate for the following reasons: 
The merits of Weak Descriptivism aren´t 
appreciated by conflating it with Strong Descriptivism. As a 
result fanciful philosophical doctrines are developed to 
“avoid naturalism” (e.g., a hyper-realistic doctrine of natural 
properties to solve the division problem). 
The merits of Strong Descriptivism (contributing to 
a wider scientific picture of human life) aren´t appreciated 
by conflating it with Weak Descriptivism, and therefore 
sticking with just “noting” forms of life in all contexts of 
investigation. 
The worth of the distinction, therefore, could lay in 
considering what kind of naturalism might be required or 
asked for when opting for a naturalistic solution seems to 
be the most promising option at hand. 
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